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ASSESSING THE SCOPE OF STATE 
UNIVERSITY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: A 
COMMENTARY ON THE VEXING DISPUTE 
OVER UCF ATHLETICS ASSOCIATION, INC. 
CHAD HINSON 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A high profile case, one garnering national media attention, presents a new 
question of law that will soon be resolved.1  The issue is narrow, but the 
implications are so broad every university within the State University System 
of Florida signed an amicus brief filed on appeal.2  The issue is whether the 
University of Central Florida Athletics Association, Inc. (UCFAA), a direct-
support organization (DSO), is primarily acting as an instrumentality of the state 
so to afford it limited state sovereign immunity.3  An instrumentality is “[a] 
means or agency through which a function of another entity is accomplished, 
such as a branch of a governing body.”4  Although the issue is specific to 
UCFAA, because it is a Direct Support Organization (DSO), the resolution of 
the question ultimately impacts more than eighty similar organizations 
 
 I would like to extend my gratitude to Richard E. Mitchell, Esq. of Gray Robinson, P.A. for his 
help and analysis.  You are a superb litigator and a true gentleman.  Many thanks also to Jordan Clark, 
Esq., Associate General Counsel for the University of Central Florida (UCF).  I am very grateful you 
took time to help me.  You are a credit to the legal profession.  This Article is dedicated to my three 
children Cameron, Kiley, and Carter.  You are my greatest gifts.  The author, Chad Hinson, Esq., is a 
member of the New York Bar in good standing. 
1. See generally UCF Athletics Ass’n v. Plancher, 121 So. 3d 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per 
curiam).  In Plancher, the parents of UCF football player filed a negligence claim against UCF and 
UFCAA after their son collapsed during a football practice and subsequently died.  Id. at 1099; see also 
Mark Fainaru-Wada, Plancher’s Parents Sue Central Florida, ESPN (Mar. 12, 2009), http:// 
sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=3973607 [hereinafter Fainaru-Wada, Plancher’s Parents]; 
Adam Jacobi, Jury Awards $10 Million to Ereck Plancher Family, CBSSPORTS.COM, http://www.cbs 
sports.com/mcc/blogs/entry/24156338/30364990 (last updated July 1, 2011, 2:19 PM).  On the first day 
of trial, the University of Central Florida was dropped as a defendant by the Planchers.  Plancher, 121 
So. 3d at 1099 n.2. 
2. See Jurisdictional Brief of Petitioner Enock Plancher at 8, UCF Athletics Ass’n v. Plancher, 121 
So. 3d 1097 (2013) (No. SC13-1872). 
3. See Plancher, 121 So. 3d at 1103. 
4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (9th ed. 2009). 
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throughout Florida.5  Under Florida law, DSOs are authorized, not-for-profit 
companies “[o]rganized and operated exclusively to receive, hold, invest, and 
administer property and to make expenditures to or for the benefit of a state 
university.”6  DSOs are commonly implemented throughout the state to 
effectuate a particular purpose an individual state university deems necessary.7  
The underlying motive for incorporating in this manner is to allow a university 
a degree of flexibility in a specific area of its operations.  An example of this is 
in fundraising, where philanthropic donors wishing to make a gift to a university 
have the choice to remain anonymous, instead of having their names published.8 
The interesting aspect of this issue centers on the unorthodox nature of the 
business organization itself.  It is a hybrid company in the sense that it operates 
in both the private and public sphere.9  While it is a creation of state government, 
it is also incorporated privately and operates with a degree of autonomy.10  The 
complexity of this issue is compounded by several factors.  The statute granting 
public universities in Florida the authority to create DSOs is silent as to the topic 
of state sovereign limited immunity.  However, another statute’s plain language 
grants instrumentalities of the state limited sovereign immunity.  But that 
ambiguity then begs the question to what is considered a corporate 
instrumentally and what is not?  More confusing is the body of Florida 
government tort law, which has been described as “a tangled web of 
incomprehensible and inconsistent principles, exceptions, and exceptions to the 
exceptions.”11  Thus, courts tasked with classifying its status as either a public 
or private entity are presented with the classic Gordian knot scenario.12 
I argue that UCFAA is an instrumentally of the state of Florida because the 
nexus between both entities is very strong and the entanglement is so 
comprehensive.  My premise is supported by critiquing the arguments, case law, 
and other relevant factors of this case. After that, I will explain why the 
 
5. Jurisdictional Brief of Petitioner Enock Plancher, supra note 2, at 8–9. 
6. FLA. STAT. § 1004.28(1)(a) (2013). 
7. See Jurisdictional Brief of Petitioner Enock Plancher, supra note 2, at 8–9. 
8. See Plancher, 121 So. 3d at 1109. 
9. See infra Part II. 
10. Id. 
11. William N. Drake, Jr. & Thomas A. Bustin, Governmental Tort Liability in Florida: A Tangled 
Web, FLA. B. J., Feb. 2003, at 8.  See generally William N. Drake, Jr. & Thomas A. Bustin, Judicial 
Tort Reform: Transforming Florida’s Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Statute, 32 STETSON L. REV. 469 
(2003). 
12. A Gordian knot is defined as, “1: an intricate problem; especially: a problem insoluble in its 
own terms—often used in the phrase cut the Gordian knot[;] 2: a knot tied by Gordius, king of Phrygia, 
held to be capable of being untied only by the future ruler of Asia, and cut by Alexander the Great with 
his sword.”  Gordian Knot, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictio 
nary/gordian%20knot (last visited Apr. 18, 2014). 
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plaintiffs’ argument falters.  At the conclusion of this Article, I will present 
some basic public policy issues to consider and predict where I believe the law 
in this area is likely headed in the future. 
II.  A HORRIBLE TRAGEDY: UCFAA V. PLANCHER 
In 2003, the University of Central Florida (UCF) incorporated a DSO given 
the name UCFAA.13  According to its Articles of Incorporation, “the purpose 
of the Corporation shall be to promote education . . . and to encourage, stimulate, 
and promote the health and physical welfare of the students of [UCF] by 
encouraging, conducting, and maintaining all kinds of intercollegiate 
athletics.”14  The specific authority for the creation of UCFAA by the UCF 
Board of Trustees is derived from both the Florida State Constitution and state 
statute.15  This process is ultimately approved by the Florida Department of 
State.16 
On March 18, 2008, UCF football player Ereck Plancher was participating 
in off-season conditioning drills inside the Nicholson Fieldhouse.17  These drills 
included lifting weights, negotiating an obstacle course, and running wind 
sprints.18  It is alleged that during those drills, Ereck began to show signs of 
fatigue.19  Although UCF head football coach “[George] O’Leary said he never 
saw Plancher in distress during the workout, but he did see him getting up after 
stumbling during a sprint.”20  At the conclusion of practice, O’Leary gathered 
the team together for a final huddle.21 
“And at that time I said, ‘Where’s Ereck Plancher?’  I said 
you’re better than that, and I expect all our wide receivers and 
DBs to be able to run.” 
 
13. Articles of Incorporation of UCF Athletic Ass’n, Inc. (Feb. 25, 2003) (on file with author). 
14. Id. 
15. FLA. CONST. art IX, § 7; FLA. STAT. § 1004.28(1)(a)(1) (2013). 
16. FLA. STAT. § 1004.28(1)(a)(1). 
17. Iliana Limón, UCF Coach George O’Leary Describes Ereck Plancher’s Final Workout, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 12, 2010), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-08-12/sports/os-geor 
ge-oleary-ereck-plancher-20100811_1_plancher-family-attorney-sickle-cell-trait-enock-and-giselle-pl 
ancher [hereinafter Limón, Coach George O’Leary]. 
18. See Associated Press, Report: UCF Player Died After Struggling Through Intense Drill, 
USATODAY.COM (Apr. 11, 2008), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/cusa/2008 
-04-11-ucf-death_N.htm. 
19. Limón, Coach George O’Leary, supra note 17. 
20. Id. 
21. Iliana Limón, Kyle Hightower & Tim Stephens, The Final Workout of Ereck Plancher, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (July 18, 2008), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/sports/orl-ucfside1808jul18,0, 
7974689.story [hereinafter Limón, The Final Workout]. 
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 O’Leary said he was talking with a staff member after the 
workout when he noticed players helping carry Plancher over 
to the athletic trainer. 
He asked [athletic trainer] Jackson what was happening, 
and the athletic trainer responded Plancher was suffering from 
dehydration and exhaustion. 
While players took Plancher outside, O’Leary tried to clear 
the coaching staff out of the fieldhouse to avoid observing 
players tossing a football because it would have been an NCAA 
violation. 
When O’Leary stepped outside, he saw Plancher was being 
propped up by a teammate while Jackson served him water.  
The player then moved and Plancher was placed flat on the 
bench. 
O’Leary said he grabbed Plancher’s hand “just to let him 
know I was there” and the player squeezed it.  He said 
Plancher’s eyes were fluttering and he was awake.  Then [head 
athletic trainer] Vander Heiden arrived to assist Jackson. . . .22 
[A] 911 call was made at 10:48 a.m. . . . [A] school official says 
rescue breathing and CPR were being administered. 
. . . An automatic external defibrillator was already attached to 
Plancher. 
A UCF trainer performed compressions while Furnas 
administered rescue breaths. . . . Plancher was placed in an 
ambulance at 11:06 a.m. 
[Sadly, h]e was pronounced dead at 11:51 a.m.23 
In the months that followed, information became available that revealed that 
prior to his death, Ereck was previously diagnosed with sickle cell trait (SCT) 
by UCFAA.24  At that time, however, testing for SCT was not mandatory by the 
 
22. Limón, Coach George O’Leary, supra note 17. 
23. Limón, The Final Workout, supra note 21; see also Mark Fainaru-Wada, Conditioned for 
Death: Could UCF Have Prevented the Ereck Plancher Tragedy?, ESPN (Nov. 2, 2008), http://sports 
.espn.go.com/espn/otl/news/story?id=3672808. 
24. SCT “is not a disease, but having it means that a person has inherited the sickle cell gene from 
one of his or her parents.”  CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT SICKLE 
CELL TRAIT, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/sicklecell/documents/SCD%20factshee 
t_Sickle%20Cell%20Trait.pdf Only if a person inherited the sickle cell gene from both parents will the 
person have sickle cell disease.  Id.  Sickle cell disease is defined as, 
a genetic condition that is present at birth.  In SCD, the red blood cells become hard and sticky and 
look like a C-shaped farm tool called a “sickle.”  The sickle cells die early, which causes a constant 
shortage of red blood cells.  Also, when they travel through small blood vessels, they get stuck and 
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NCAA.25 
UCF coach George O’Leary said during a deposition he 
knew wide receiver Ereck Plancher had [SCT], but he thought 
the player was suffering from dehydration on the day he died. 
O’Leary said athletic trainer Robert Jackson initially told 
him Plancher was dehydrated and exhausted following [the] 
offseason conditioning workout. . . .26 
The issue of SCT tragedy is not a new phenomenon in NCAA athletics and 
neither are the resulting civil actions against universities.27  However, the issue 
of responsibility for detection by the NCAA is one that is contested.28  
Following the tragic death of Rice football player Dale Lloyd II in September 
2006, a lawsuit was filed against the NCAA.29  The lawsuit ultimately settled, 
but as a result the NCAA for the first time announced that “it would recommend 
all of its student-athletes be tested for SCT.”30  While individuals can opt out if 
they agree to education and sign liability waivers, mandatory SCT education 
and confirmation of SCT status of athletes began in 2010 for Division I 
schools.31  In 2012, it also became a requirement for Division II schools and 
 
clog the blood flow.  This can cause pain and other serious problems. 
Id. 
25. Background on Sickle Cell Trait and the NCAA, NCAA.ORG (Sept. 9, 2010), http://ncaastud 
ent.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/latest+news/2010+news+stories/september+latest+ne
ws/background+on+sickle+cell+trait+and+the+ncaa (“determin[ing] that mandatory screening is the 
best way to raise awareness among student-athletes and coaches and prevent potential serious illness or 
death in student-athletes who may carry the trait”). 
26. Limón, Coach George O’Leary, supra note 17. 
27. E.g. Barry Pound, Family Settles Wrongful Death Lawsuit Against Ole Miss, NCAA, LANIER 
L. FIRM, http://www.lanierlawfirm.com/law_firm_news/family-settles-wrongful-death-lawsuit-agains 
t-ole-miss-ncaa.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2014). 
28. Compare Alejandro Bautista, Comment, College Football's Serial Murderer: Sickle Cell Trait, 
21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 403 (2010) (discussing the critical issue of SCT among college football 
players and praising the proactive steps taken by the NCAA in April 2010), with Janis L. Abkowitz, 
President’s Column—Sickle Cell Trait and Sports: Is the NCAA a Hematologist?, AM. SOC’Y 
HEMATOLOGY (May 1, 2013), www.hematology.org/Publications/Hematologist/2013/10463. aspx 
(arguing the NCAA policy attributes risk inappropriately), and John A. Kark, David M. Posey, Harold 
R. Schumacher, & Charles J. Ruehle, Sickle-Cell Trait as a Risk Factor for Sudden Death in Physical 
Training, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 781 (1987) (stating that testing sickle cell trait athletes is unwise). 
29. Brett Zarda, Lawsuit Prompts NCAA to Screen Athletes for Sickle Cell, USATODAY.COM, ht 
tp://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/2010-06-30-sickle-cell-ncaa-cover_N.htm (last updated 
July 2, 2010). 
30. Megan Manfull, Rice Has Lead in NCAA Initiative After Lawsuit, HOUS. CHRON. (June 30, 
2009), http://www.chron.com/sports/rice/article/Rice-has-lead-in-NCAA-initiative-after-lawsuit-1723 
629.php. 
31. Scott Hensley, Blood Doctors Call Foul on NCAA’s Screening for Sickle Cell, NPR (Jan. 26, 
2012, 6:07 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/01/26/145923225/blood-doctors-call-foul-on-
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extended to Division III in 2013.32  A recent lawsuit filed in Allegheny County 
Common Pleas Court underscores the continued seriousness of this issue in 
collegiate athletics.33 
A.  The Legal Battle 
A negligence action was subsequently filed by the estate of Plancher, and 
the suit named both UCFAA and the UCF Board of Trustees as defendants.34  
While clearly sympathetic, UCFAA also disputed the claim and publicly 
defended its actions.35  At the time, UCF spokesman Grant Heston stated: 
“‘While the lawsuit limits what the university can say, what we know to date 
about the March 18 workout indicates that coaches and staff acted 
appropriately. . . . Per university policy, UCF will not discuss specifics about 
the lawsuit.’”36 
UCFAA argued from pretrial motions through appeal it functions as an 
instrumentality of UCF (and therefore on behalf of the state of Florida).37  If the 
courts affirmed, this would enable UCFAA to cap the amount of damages the 
plaintiffs could claim to $200,000 in the event of an adverse jury verdict.38  If 
the trial court rejected UCFAA’s argument, however, it could potentially be 
exposed to high liability.39  Aware of this, the plaintiffs countered by insisting 
UCFAA is a private company.40  If true, UCFAA would be considered outside 
the umbra of Florida’s limited sovereign immunity statute. 
Before trial, UCFAA filed a pretrial motion for summary judgment 
requesting that Judge Robert Evans issue a favorable ruling that as a direct 
support corporation, UCFAA was entitled to limited sovereign immunity 
 
ncaas -screening-for-sickle-cell. 
32. Associated Press, NCAA, Div. II School Sued over Sickle Cell Death, USATODAY.COM (Sept. 
9, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2013/09/09/slippery-rock-ncaa-sued-ove r-
sickle-cell-death-of-jack-hill-jr/2787507/. 
33. See Rob Dauster, NCAA, D-II Slippery Rock Sued over Death of Jack Hill, Jr., 
C.BASKETBALLTALK (Sept. 10, 2013), http://collegebasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/09/10/ncaa-d-
ii-slippery-rock-sued-over-death-of-jack-hill-jr/. 
34. Aisling Swift, Family of Former Lely Football Star Files Wrongful Death Suit Against UCF, 
NAPLES DAILY NEWS, http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2009/mar/12/former-lely-football-player-pl 
anchers-family-sues-/?print=1 (last updated Mar. 12, 2009). 
35. See Fainaru-Wada, Plancher’s Parents, supra note 1. 
36. Swift, supra note 34. 
37. See Brief on Jurisdiction of Respondents UCF Athletics Ass’n, Inc., & Great Am. Assurance 
Co. at 6–9, Plancher v. UCF Athletics Ass’n, 121 So. 3d 1097 (2013) (No. SC13-1872). 
38. Id. at 4 (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (2013)). 
39. See generally Jurisdictional Brief of Petitioner Enock Plancher, supra note 2. 
40. Id. 
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protection.41  In response, the Planchers stated that under Florida law, UCF did 
not exert the sufficient control necessary over UCFAA for it to be considered 
an instrumentality of UCF.42  At the hearing on the matter, attorneys 
representing the Plancher family argued that UCFAA was created so the athletic 
department could operate without worrying about observing state laws: “‘[t]hey 
wanted to grow, . . . [t]hey elected to privatize[,] and they don’t have to deal 
with any state rules.’”43  In reference to UCF’s unilateral ability to dissolve 
UCFAA, defense counsel Richard Mitchell said “‘Power to destroy is the 
ultimate power to control.’”44 
On March 24, 2010, Judge Evans, ruling against UCF, states: 
The undisputed evidence in this case demonstrates to this 
court the UCF Athletic Association has not been substantially 
controlled by UCF in either day-to-day decisions or major 
programmatic decisions . . . . 
. . . 
University direct-support organizations were formed to 
promote private fund-raising in support of public universities. 
. . . It is unlikely that the Legislature when authorizing 1004.28 
envisioned the present scope of the UCF Athletic Association.  
In its present form, the UCF Athletic Association has been 
expanded in some cases beyond the limits allowable by the state 
as evidenced by the Florida monitor general’s reversal of the 
policy of transferring student athletic fees to the UCF Athletic 
Association.45 
Essentially, his position was that because the statute on DSOs was silent as 
to the sovereign immunity, the legislature did not intend for it to be granted.  
UCF and UCFAA strongly disagreed with the ruling, “We respect Judge Evans’ 
 
41. See generally Defendant’s Motion for Judgment in Accordance with Motion for Directed 
Verdict/Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Motion for New Trial, and Motion for 
Remittitur, Plancher, 121 So. 3d 1097 (No. 2009-CA-007444-0) [hereinafter Defendant’s Motion for 
Judgment].  This is the first appeal from the trial court decision following Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530 and 
1.480.  Under Florida rules of procedure, the party seeking appeal must first do so at the presiding trial 
court. 
42. See Jurisdictional Brief of Petitioner Enock Plancher, supra note 2, at 7–9. 
43. Iliana Limón, UCF Ereck Plancher Case Settlement Cap Argument Remains Unsettled, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 13, 2010), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-08-13/sports/os-ucf-
ereck-plancher-hearing-20100813_1_plancher-family-settlement-cap-ucfaa. 
44. Id. 
45. Iliana Limón, Judge Rules Against UCF in Ereck Plancher Lawsuit, ORLANDO SENTINEL 
(Sept. 24, 2010), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-09-24/sports/os-ucf-ereck-plancher-ruling-
20100924_1_ucfaa-ucf-campus-march-giselle-plancher. 
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decision but respectfully disagree . . . . The law and state statutes clearly show 
that the UCF Athletics Association is a state agency and subject to sovereign 
immunity.  We will evaluate all of our options, and an appeal is certainly one of 
them.”46  As a result of the ruling, the jury at trial never heard the argument. 
Opening arguments began on June 15, 2011, despite UCFAA’s grave 
concerns they would not be given a fair trial.47  During the course of a very 
contentious and acrimonious trial, UCFAA strongly contested multiple issues 
of fact, evidence, and trial procedure.  UCFAA presented medical evidence and 
testimony which supported their claim that Ereck passed away of Fibro 
Muscular Dysplasia of the sinoatrial nodal artery, and not a “sickling collapse,” 
as the Planchers theorized.48  Moreover, it was UCFAA’s position that no 
medical evidence was presented by the Planchers’ showing that had UCFAA 
pulled Ereck out of drills earlier, it would have made a difference in saving his 
life.49  To counter the Planchers’ claim of negligence, UCFAA tried to bring 
into evidence the fact that two other UCF football players with SCT were 
present and participated in the same practice/conditioning drill.50  However, the 
trial judge denied it over a dispute regarding discovery.  One interesting point 
of note is the trial judge allowed the Planchers over eight days to present their 
case, while limiting UCFAA to less than three.51 
On June 30, 2011, the jury returned a favorable verdict for Planchers, 
finding UCFAA negligent.52  While the jury did not find that UCFAA acted 
with gross negligence in the case, they did award statutory survivors, Enock 
Plancher and Gisele Plancher, compensatory damages in the amount of $5 
million each, for a total verdict of $10 million.53  No punitive damages were 
 
46. Id. 
47. Iliana Limón, UCF Files Motion to Disqualify Judge in Ereck Plancher Wrongful Death 
Lawsuit, ORLANDO SENTINEL (June 6, 2011), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-06-06/sports 
/os-ereck-plancher-trial-ucf-0607-20110606_1_plancher-family-attorneys-ucf-attorneys-judge-robert-
m-evans; see also Defendant’s Motion for Judgment, supra note 41, at 23.  UCFAA appealed over 133 
errors of law during the course of this trial in its appeal to Judge Robert Evans.  See Id.  While very 
well written, it leaves no ambiguity regarding UCFAA’s displeasure with the trial. 
48. See Defendant’s Motion for Judgment, supra note 41, at 3.  UCFAA argued it was entitled to 
a directed verdict after the Planchers’ case, based on the fact they presented expert testimony that 
conflicted with the plaintiffs’ evidence.  As such, the Planchers’ claim was based on impermissibly 
stacked inferences. 
49. See id. at 31. 
50. Id. at 21. 
51. Id. at 23. 
52. UCF Found Negligent in Plancher’s Death, UPI.COM (July 1, 2011), http://www.upi.com/ 
Top_News/US/2011/07/01/UCF-found-negligent-in-Planchers-death/UPI-72101309546628/. 
53. Jacobi, supra note 1. 
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assessed.54 
On August 2, 2011, Judge Evans again rejected all UCFAA’s arguments 
and ruled unilaterally in favor of the Planchers.55  Still confident in the strength 
of its legal argument, UCFAA subsequently appealed the trial court decision to 
Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal.56  The scope of its argument before the 
court was reduced to three substantive issues.  First, UCFAA argued it was 
denied a fair trial.57  Second, “the trial court erred when it denied UCFAA’s 
motion for summary judgment” regarding the medical waiver Ereck Plancher 
signed prior to commencement playing for UCF.58  Third, the trial court erred 
when it entered judgment against UCFAA on the issue of limited sovereign 
immunity as an instrumentality.59  In response, the Planchers argued that as a 
condition precedent to claiming sovereign immunity, UCF had to exercise 
actual control over the ‘“detailed physical performance” and “day-to-day 
operations”‘ over UCFAA.60  Furthermore, because UCF and UCFAA 
previously signed an Intercollegiate Athletics written services agreement that 
had a provision disclaiming the relationship as “‘a joint venture, partnership, or 
other like relationship,’” the Planchers argued this severed UCFAA’s 
instrumentality claim.61 
B.  Established Law 
In finding a logical resolution to this issue, the place to start from a historical 
perspective is the seminal case on point regarding the issue of instrumentalities 
of government.  In United States v. Orleans, the U.S. Supreme Court was tasked 
with answering whether state community action agencies are an instrumentality 
of the federal government.62  Under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 
 
54. Id. 
55. Iliana Limón, Judge Denies UCFAA Motion for New Trial, Declines to Alter Ereck Plancher 
Verdict, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 2, 2011), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-08-02/sports/os 
-ereck-plancher-ucf-hearing-0803-20110802_1_plancher-family-ucfaa-attorneys-ucf-athletics-associa 
tion. 
56. Sarah Aslam, UCFAA Files Plancher Appeal, CENT. FLA. FUTURE, http://www.centralflorida 
future.com/news/ucfaa-files-plancher-appeal-1.2741479 (last updated May 23, 2012). 
57. See generally UCF Athletics Ass’n v. Plancher, 121 So. 3d 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) 
(per curiam).  The 5th District Court of Appeal found no merit in UCFAA’s argument regarding its 
position on the fairness of the trial, but this author disagrees with the court.  See id. at 1099 n.3. 
58. Id. at 1099. 
59. Id. 
60. Jurisdictional Brief of Petitioner Enock Plancher, supra note 2, at 8 (citing Prison Rehab. Inds. 
v. Betterson, 648 So. 2d 778, 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995; Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. 
Lee, 478 So. 2d 77, 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
61. Plancher, 121 So. 3d at 1107 n.14. 
62. U.S. v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976) (defining instrumentalities of federal government); see 
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federal money was allocated to authorized action agencies with the intent of 
helping low-income families reach self-sufficiency.63  In return, the agencies 
were subjected to a degree of federal regulation.64  In the case, an approved 
Ohio action agency, named the Warren-Trumbull Council, planned a 
recreational outing for kids.65  During the trip, a child participating was injured 
when the car he was in driven by an employee of the agency collided with a 
parked truck.66  The boy’s father subsequently sued the United States for 
negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act.67  The father alleged the state 
agency itself was an instrumentality of the federal government.68 
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court determined whether an agency is 
considered an arm of the federal government by assessing the actual degree of 
control the legislature intended to have over the agency.69  Although the Court 
found the federal government implemented regulations and guidelines for the 
agency to follow, they were merely for passive assurance federal money was 
properly spent.70  Moreover, the Court found the federal government 
specifically intended to delegate the power of control over the Warren-Trumbull 
Counsel to the locals.71  The way they accomplished this was relinquishing the 
ability to serve on its Board of Directors.  The Court stated that when Congress 
implements programs and projects it finances by gifts, grants, contracts, or 
loans, the recipients do not automatically become arms of the federal 
government.72  The method the Court used to determine the status of an 
instrumentality mandates the government intend to have actual control over the 
“detailed physical performance” and “day to day operations.”73  As such, the 
Court determined the Warren-Trumbull Counsel was not held to be an 
instrumentality because the federal government did not meet the control 
 
also Hines v. Cenla Cmty. Action Comm., Inc., 474 F.2d 1052, 1058 (5th Cir. 1973). 
63. Orleans, 425 U.S. at 809. 
64. Id. at 816 (“Similarly, by contract, the Government may fix specific and precise conditions to 
implement federal objectives.  Although such regulations are aimed at assuring compliance with goals, 
the regulations do not convert the acts of entrepreneurs—or of state governmental bodies—into federal 
governmental acts.”). 
65. Id. at 810. 
66. Id. 
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012)  The Federal Tort Claims Act is a limited waiver of sovereign 
immunity, making the Federal Government liable to the same extent as a private party for certain torts 
of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.  Id. 
68. Orleans, 425 U.S. at 810–11. 
69. Id. at 816–17. 
70. Id. at 818. 
71. Id. at 818–19. 
72. Id. at 816. 
73. Id. at 814–15. 
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requirements over it.74 
However, the rule must be tempered with the realization that, in this case, 
the federal government intentionally delegated complete control over 
operations to the local government.75  This is a major distinction that must be 
noted when applying the rule to cases where the issue is government 
instrumentalities.  Thus, while the rule of law is a government must show actual 
control over the “detailed physical performance” and “day-to-day operations,” 
it is logical to also consider the actual intent of the government in question when 
applying the rule to other fact patterns. 
With that in mind, the rule in Florida on government instrumentalities is 
consistent with the holding in Orleans regarding control.76  However, Florida 
case law tempers that rule by also recognizing that “actual control” by the 
government over a private agency or business can be effectuated simply by 
placing certain constraints in place over it.77  In this case, UCF has “actual 
control” over UCFAA and multiple constraints in place to demonstrate it.  For 
instance, the UCFAA by-laws require that four of the six directors on UCFAA’s 
board of directors be from UCF.78  Moreover, in the Intercollegiate Athletics 
Services Agreement between UCFAA and UCF, UCF has a right to audit 
UCFAA’s records.79  Through its Articles of Incorporation, UCF has the final 
authority to dissolve UCFAA.80  UCF’s President ultimately remains 
responsible for the athletic program.81 Indeed, UCFAA exists and operates 
solely at the pleasure and discretion of UCF. 
A similar type set of facts are seen in Prison Rehabilitative Industries v. 
Betterson.82  In that case, the Florida Legislature granted the Florida Department 
 
74. Id. at 819. 
75. Id. at 818 (“Nothing could be plainer than the congressional intent that the local entities here 
in question have complete control over operations of their own programs with the Federal Government 
supplying financial aid, advice, and oversight only to assure that federal funds not be diverted to 
unauthorized purposes.”). 
76. See Pagan v. Sarasota Cnty. Pub. Hosp. Bd., 884 So. 2d 257, 267–68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) 
(Canady, J., concurring) (citing Orleans, 425 U.S. at 807) (holding that structural controls in place by 
the government over an agency meet the threshold to grant the agency limited state sovereign 
immunity). 
77. Pagan, 884 So. 2d at 267–69. 
78. UCF Athletics Ass’n v. Plancher, 121 So. 3d 1097, 1104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per 
curiam). 
79. Intercollegiate Athletics Services Agreement between UFC & UFC Athletic Ass’n, Inc. § 13 
(July 1, 2005). 
80. Articles of Incorporation of UCF Athletic Ass’n, Inc., supra note 13; see also Plancher, 121 
So. 3d at 1108. 
81. Plancher, 121 So. 3d at 1107. 
82. 648 So. 2d 778 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
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of Corrections (Department) the ability to lease a prison agricultural program to 
a private, not-for-profit business named PRIDE.83  The Florida legislature, at 
the time, concluded doing this would “provide for more effective and efficient 
management and administration, and contain the cost of the correctional 
system.”84  While PRIDE operated with a degree of autonomy, certain statutory 
constraints by the legislature were set in place to control it.  For instance, 
“PRIDE [was] subjected to both financial and performance audits by the 
Auditor General,” its articles of incorporation had to be approved by the 
legislature, and the Department of Corrections had “to approve policies and 
procedures established by PRIDE.”85 
In 1988, a plaintiff brought an action in negligence against PRIDE claiming 
she was injured by a cow owned by PRIDE after it ran onto the highway that 
she was driving on.86  In return, PRIDE argued it was an instrumentality of the 
state.  Like Plancher v.UCFAA, the issue in that case was determining the status 
of PRIDE.  The issue centered on whether the state had “actual control” over 
this company, because PRIDE had both latitude and discretion in its “day-to day 
operations.”87  In resolving the issue, the court noted that “while PRIDE was 
accorded substantial independence in the running of the work programs, its 
essential operations nevertheless remained subject to a number of legislatively 
mandated constraints over its day-to-day operations.”88  Because proper 
controls were in place, the court held PRIDE was an instrumentality of Florida.  
This case bolsters UCFAA’s theory on appeal that the Planchers’ theory 
mistakenly confuses “actual” control with “actively” controlling when 
determining the status of UCF’s power over UCFAA. 
To cast further doubt on the Planchers’ argument, a recent Florida Supreme 
Court case also held that a corporation is an instrumentality of the state when 
the state acts through it.89  Moreover, Justice Canaday, a current Florida 
Supreme Court judge, wrote a concurring opinion on the issue of 
instrumentalities of government and the topic of control.90  Using the analogy 
of a principal agent relationship to state government and their instrumentalities, 
Justice Canady wrote: 
 
83. Id. at 780. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 779. 
87. Id. at 780–81 & n.3. 
88. Id. at 780. 
89. Keck v. Eminisor, 104 So. 3d 359, 369 (Fla. 2012). 
90. See Pagan v. Sarasota Cnty. Pub. Hosp. Bd., 884 So. 2d 257, 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) 
(Canady, J., concurring) (stating a state entity had sufficient control over a private corporation and thus 
the company was entitled to sovereign immunity). 
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It would be unfaithful to the plain meaning of section 
768.28(2) to impose a requirement for control of a type that is 
inconsistent with the separate corporate existence of the entity 
acting primarily as an instrumentality or agency.  The 
authorization of immunity for corporations under section 
768.28(2) necessarily involves a recognition that those 
corporations will carry out their operations in a manner that is 
separate and distinct from the operations of the governmental 
entity to which they are related.  The control of the 
governmental entity over the corporation necessary to establish 
an instrumentality relationship under section 768.28(2) does 
not require that the corporation be subsumed in the 
governmental entity.91 
C.  The Outcome 
On August 16, 2013, in a per curium opinion, Florida’s Fifth District Court 
of Appeal reversed the Orange County Circuit Court’s final judgment.92  While 
affirming the Circuit Court’s findings on UCFAA’s claims over the issues of 
trial fairness and the medical waiver, the court ultimately agreed with UCFAA’s 
instrumentality claim.93  Furthermore, the court held that the disclaimer 
provision regarding the business relationship between UCF and UCFAA in their 
service agreement did not sever UCFAA’s instrumentality status.94  Finally, 
regarding the level of control so vigorously disputed between the two parties, 
the court found that UCF ultimately had sufficient amount of control necessary 
over UCFAA by virtue of the institutional constraints in place at the time of 
incorporation.95  As a result of its finding UCFAA an instrumentality of the 
state, it also lowered the amount of damages to $200,000, the statutory 
sovereign immunity cap.  Unhappy with the holding, the Planchers filed a brief 
requesting the Florida Supreme Court use its discretionary jurisdiction power to 
hear this case.96 
 
91. Id. 
92. UCF Athletics Ass’n v. Plancher, 121 So. 3d 1097, 1099 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per 
curiam). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 1107 n.14. 
95. Id. at 1109. 
96. Jurisdictional Brief of Petitioner Enock Plancher, supra note 2, at 1. 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
The intent of UCF to control UCFAA from the outset is also revealed from 
an internal document UCF created in 2005.  Three years before the tragic death 
of Ereck Plancher, UCF answered an NCAA Institution Self-Study Instrument 
Report.97  In the report, UCF answers the NCAA’s question regarding who is 
responsible for oversight and compliance. In answering, UCF stated: 
The UCF Board of Trustees has the ultimate authority for 
institutional control over the UCFAA and has delegated this 
authority to the UCF President.  The UCF President oversees 
the institutional control process over the UCFAA Board of 
Directors, the Director of Athletics, and all UCFAA personnel.  
UCFAA’s oversight includes all other university personnel that 
interact with the UCFAA in administering and monitoring 
compliance with all institutional, NCAA, state, and federal 
rules and regulations. 
Specifically, the Director of Athletics is charged with 
making certain that all members of the UCFAA staff have full 
knowledge of and abide by the rules and regulations of the 
university, the NCAA, and the conference.  In addition, the 
Director of Athletics is responsible to the UCF President and 
receives direction and advice on general policy matters from 
the Faculty Athletics Representative and the Athletics 
Committee. 
UCF is organized to maintain compliance with NCAA 
rules by maintaining institutional control over the UCFAA.98 
This document, along with UCFAA’s Articles of Incorporation, by-laws, 
and corporate hierarchy, are prima facie evidence of state government acting 
through a company, and thus creating the classic instrumentality.99  The 
Plaintiffs in this case argue the Florida legislature did not expressly extend 
sovereign immunity to all university DSOs.  The legislature did, however, 
expressly grant limited sovereign immunity to instrumentalities of the state.  At 
bottom, the main weakness with the Planchers’ legal argument is it makes little 
sense.  If UCFAA is not an instrumentality, then what is?  “As [former United 
 
97. See generally U. CENT. FLA., GOVERNANCE AND COMMITMENT TO RULES COMPLIANCE 
(2005), available at http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/ucf/genrel/auto_pdf/ncaa-selfstudy-governan 
ce.pdf. 
98. Id. at 27. 
99. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 870 (defining an instrumentality as “[a] 
means or agency through which a function of another entity is accomplished, such as a branch of a 
governing body.”). 
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States] Chief [Justice Burger] was fond of saying, that made no sense.  And if it 
didn’t make good sense, how could it make good law?”100  With that in mind, 
UCFAA has an overwhelming amount of factors and law that favor its 
argument.  While state sovereign immunity law should not extend past the 
legislative grant, that is simply not the case here.  The DSO is a specific creation 
of the Florida state legislature. 
From a policy standpoint, as well as common sense, there should be a bright 
line where the grant of sovereign immunity ceases to extend on public university 
settings.  Equally important, however, is protecting legitimate instrumentalities 
of the state from aggressive litigants motivated by windfall verdicts disguised 
as the pursuit of justice.  In the event UCFAA and other DSOs are ultimately 
granted limited sovereign immunity, I am skeptical you will see an explosion of 
these organizations for fiscal reasons.  However, in the event DSOs are held to 
be private organizations, it is likely the death knell of the entity out of liability 
concerns and costs.  Justice Antonin Scalia once said “[t]he value of any . . . 
rule . . . must be assessed not only on the basis of what is gained, but also on the 
basis of what is lost.”101  While Florida gains a new rule, which hopefully moves 




100. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 98 
(Simon & Shuster, 1st paperback ed. 2005). 
101. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 161 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
